

# Securing Critical OT Systems in a Railroad

**Pitfalls and Best Practices** 

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May 23-24, 2023 – Third Annual Rail Cybersecurity USA – Chicago Illinois USA

**How do you define Operational Technology?** 

How does your organization define OT?

What does "critical" mean to you? To others?



# **Key Components of a Rail OT Cyber Security Program**

#### What are you protecting?

- Clear definition of what is OT
- 2. High Level Systems Inventory
- 3. Process for Classifying Systems: IT, OT or in-between
- 4. Process for Determining Criticality
- 5. Identify Risk Scenarios for **your** Critical Systems
- 6. OT Asset Inventory
- 7. Keeping Documentation up to date

### **Tooling & Process**

- 1. Establish OT Cyber Security Policy leverage NIST framework
- 2. Automated OT Asset Inventory Tooling
- 3. Server and End-Point Protection
- 4. Active Vulnerability Management: Scanning, Anti-Virus
- 5. Network and Firewall Monitoring
- 6. Patching Program
- 7. Patching Program to Manage Hard to Patch Systems
- 8. Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Testing Program

## **Building More Robust Systems**

- 1. System Lifecycle Management
- 2. Network Segmentation & Active Firewalls Between Zones
- 3. Managing OT system access and user accounts
- 4. Software Architecture Standards, Positions and Templates
- 5. Security Architecture Standards, Positions and Templates
- 6. Security Reviews
- 7. Building in Event Logging / Monitoring

#### **Tooling & Process**

- 1. Identifying Risks to OT Systems
- 2. Developing Controls to Mitigate Risks
- 3. Company-wide Security Standards
- 4. Regular Security Reviews
- 5. Documenting and Regularly Reviewing Exceptions
- 6. OT-specific threat intelligence and education programs
- 7. Building OT intelligence into a Security Operations Centre
- 8. OT Incident Response Working with Internal OT Teams

"Taking the time to understand what each OT system does, it's risk profile, the team that owns it, and how it affects operations"

## **Some Common OT Cyber Security Pitfalls**

- 1. Trying to manually maintain OT Asset Inventories without Automated Tools
- 2. Trying to keep OT Systems Fully Air-Gapped thinking it is too risky to add connectivity to monitor them
- 3. Having too few OT network zones and/or having too firewall rules that are not nuanced enough
- 4. Not having additional protections and controls for OT user accounts
- 5. Not keeping track of Vulnerabilities / Patches for Older OT Systems
- 6. Not Regularly Reviewing Older Systems and Regularly Documenting What can be Patched (and what can't)
- 7. Missing documentation & drawings for OT Systems or (worse) trying to keep too many documents up to date
- 8. Not regularly reviewing "break glass" procedures used to access OT systems in an emergency
- 9. Feeding Logs from OT systems directly into an IT-focused Security Operational Centre without context
- 10. Relying only on IT-focused vulnerability alerts/notifications for OT systems
- 11. Not having Vendor Support Agreements in place for operational OT systems
- 12. Not Engaging with internal OT System owners to better understand how their systems work and their needs

## **Some OT Cyber Security Best Practices**

- 1. Take the time to understand how various OT systems are used, what they do, and their impact on operations
- 2. Maintain both a high-level and detailed listings of OT systems and the assets in them
- 3. Use OT-focused Automated Tools for doing OT Asset Inventory, but be careful with automated scanning tools
- 4. Have a clear definitions for "OT" and "critical" and have documented processes for classifying systems
- 5. Use Network Segmentation & Firewall Rules to separate OT systems, including back-office and field segments
- 6. Have additional protections for OT user accounts, particularly for admin/technician access to OT systems
- 7. Design redundancy into OT systems, so that if IT systems have an issue, OT systems can continue to function
- 8. Have a Strong OT Security Policy Framework with Policies, Standards, Guidelines, Positions, and Patterns
- 9. Provide a process for documenting, and regularly reviewing any exceptions needed for specific OT systems
- 10. Use Compensating Controls when legacy OT systems cannot accommodate modern cyber security controls
- 11. Use OT-focused tools to implement server and end-point vulnerability detection and protection
- 12. Provide system development teams with security architecture requirements, positions and patterns

